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Incentive-based approaches to sustainable
fisheries
R. Quentin Grafton, Ragnar Arnason, Trond Bjørndal, David Campbell,
Harry F. Campbell, Colin W. Clark, Robin Connor, Diane P. Dupont,
Rögnvaldur Hannesson, Ray Hilborn, James E. Kirkley, Tom Kompas,
Daniel E. Lane, Gordon R. Munro, Sean Pascoe, Dale Squires,
Stein Ivar Steinshamn, Bruce R. Turris, and Quinn Weninger
Abstract: The failures of traditional target-species management have led many to propose an ecosystem approach to
fisheries to promote sustainability. The ecosystem approach is necessary, especially to account for fishery–ecosystem
interactions, but by itself is not sufficient to address two important factors contributing to unsustainable fisheries:
inappropriate incentives bearing on fishers and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, devel-
oped fisheries managed primarily by total-harvest limits and input controls. We contend that much greater emphasis
must be placed on fisher motivation when managing fisheries. Using evidence from more than a dozen natural experi-
ments in commercial fisheries, we argue that incentive-based approaches that better specify community and individual
harvest or territorial rights and price ecosystem services and that are coupled with public research, monitoring, and ef-
fective oversight promote sustainable fisheries. 710
Résumé : Les échecs des aménagements traditionnels centrés sur les espèces-cibles ont incité plusieurs chercheurs à
proposer des approches halieutiques basées sur les écosystèmes pour favoriser les pêches durables. L’approche écosys-
témique est nécessaire, en particulier, pour tenir compte des interactions pêche–écosystème; elle ne suffit pas,
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cependant, par elle-même pour régler deux facteurs importants qui contribuent à rendre les pêches non durables : les
incitations insuffisantes pour les pêcheurs et la gestion inefficace souvent présente dans les pêches commerciales déve-
loppées qui sont régies principalement par des limites à la récolte totale et par des contrôles d’entrée. Nous croyons
qu’on doit mettre beaucoup plus l’accent sur la motivation des pêcheurs dans la gestion de la pêche. En utilisant des
données provenant de plus d’une douzaine d’expériences naturelles de pêche commerciale, nous cherchons à démontrer
que des approches fondées sur les incitations qui précisent mieux la communauté, les récoltes individuelles et les droits
territoriaux et qui évaluent aussi financièrement les services de l’écosystème, couplées avec de la recherche gouverne-
mentale, de la surveillance et de la gestion efficace, promeuvent les pêches commerciales durables.
[Traduit par la Rédaction] Grafton et al.
Introduction
Marine ecosystems are in global decline (Pauly et al. 1998;
Buckworth 2001; Schiermeier 2002). The main cause is un-
sustainable fishing practices (Hannesson 2002) that arise
from the following six principal factors: (i) inappropriate in-
centives; (ii) high demand for limited resources; (iii) pov-
erty; (iv) inadequate knowledge; (v) ineffective governance;
and (vi) interactions among fishery sectors and other aspects
of the environment (Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) 2002a).
In response to fisheries failures and a fall in the total catch
in marine capture fisheries (Hilborn et al. 2003), many have
proposed an ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) that
gives greater weight to integrated management and empha-
sizes the importance of maintaining ecosystem health for
future generations (Ecosystem Principles Advisory Panel
1999; Busch et al. 2003; Browman et al. 2004). While EAF
highlights the importance of fishery–ecosystem interactions
and knowledge gaps, with a few exceptions (ICES 2005a), it
overlooks the importance of fisher behavior and incentives
for fisheries management.
In this paper, we examine what can be done to mitigate
the factors that contribute to unsustainability in commercial
and industrial fisheries. Our focus is on inappropriate fisher
incentives and ineffective governance, and we argue that a
much greater emphasis should be placed on fisher motiva-
tion when managing marine resources (Larkin 1978). We
propose incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries
(IAFs) to complement EAF and existing management ap-
proaches that promote sustainability. We contend that fishers
need economic rights and accompanying responsibilities, as
well as price signals, to provide incentives for individual and
collective action that promote more sustainable fishing prac-
tices.
The ecosystem approach: necessary, but not sufficient
The goals of ecosystem-based management are to promote
healthy and resilient marine ecosystems and sustainable fish-
eries (FAO 2002b; Garcia et al. 2003). A key component of
this approach is the conservation and protection of key habi-
tats that are critical for ecosystem and population processes
(Pikitch et al. 2004), primarily through the enforcement of
marine reserves and no-take areas (Garcia et al. 2003).
Reserves can lead to increased abundance, size, and bio-
diversity (Halpern 2003), as well as a more fecund population
(Palumbi 2004) within no-take areas, and can potentially in-
crease harvests in exploited areas via fish migration (Roberts
et al. 2001; Gell and Roberts 2003). No-take areas are par-
ticularly helpful in the face of uncertainties (Lauck et al.
1998) and can also promote resilience to shocks and raise
profitability, even when harvesting is optimal (Grafton et al.
2005). Despite these benefits, reserves only address some of
the problems in fisheries (Allison et al. 1998; Leal et al.
2005) and do nothing to overcome key contributors to un-
sustainability, such as overcapacity. Reserves also do noth-
ing to provide incentives for fishers to take into account the
full impact of their harvesting practices on fisheries.
Other aspects of EAF include the use of the precautionary
approach and the management of target and non-target spe-
cies within the broader context of overall marine ecosys-
tems, paying particular attention to bycatch, discarding, and
habitat destruction (Pikitch et al. 2004). We endorse these
approaches and the goals of ecosystem-based management
but contend that a shift in priorities from target species to
ecosystems (Pikitch et al. 2004) by itself does not recognize
the importance of fisher behavior and their motivations
(Hilborn 2004). Unless fisher incentives and associated gov-
ernance arrangements are compatible with long-term goals
of sustainability (Hilborn et al. 2005), EAF, or any other al-
ternative to traditional, commercial fisheries management,
will fail to prevent overharvesting of stocks or change fishing
practices that damage habitat.
Failures of traditional, commercial fisheries management
The traditional approach to commercial fisheries manage-
ment restricts fishing inputs and imposes total catch limits in
an attempt to control fishing mortality. Input controls in-
crease the costs of fishing and frequently fail in their objec-
tive to limit fishing effort because harvesters are often able
to substitute unregulated inputs for controlled ones, causing
a gradual expansion of effort, referred to as effort creep (Wilen
1979; Scott and Neher 1981). Competitive total allowable
catches (TACs) in input-controlled fisheries also provide in-
centives for fishers to race against each other for a share of
the catch before the total harvest limit is reached. Such rac-
ing behavior frequently results in fishers investing in unregu-
lated inputs to increase their effective fishing capacity at the
expense of others. In turn, these investments and the race to
fish increase overall harvesting costs, lower the total net re-
turns from fishing and jeopardize the sustainability of fisher-
ies.
The traditional approach to commercial fisheries manage-
ment fails to address the technical change that makes fishing
more effective over time (Squires 1992) and does not instil a
long-term perspective in fishers. For example, in the North
Sea cod (Gadus morhua) fishery, some harvesters oppose re-
ductions in the total allowable catch, despite the fact that the
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spawning stock is below a level that demands a harvesting
moratorium (European Environment Agency 2004). In Can-
ada’s northern cod fishery, the regulator’s concerns that
reduced harvests would generate bankruptcies and unemploy-
ment, coupled with uncertainties over the status of stocks
(Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2004a) and overestimation of
stocks and recruitment (Walters and Maguire 1996), resulted
in the TACs being set too high and was a major contributor
to stock collapse in the 1990s (Hutchings and Myers 1994).
The negative consequences of input controls, whether they
are applied to traditional target-species management or eco-
system approaches, are illustrated by the recent experience
in Australia’s federally managed fisheries. In the past
10 years, the Australian federal government has committed
US$60 million per year to fisheries research and ecologi-
cally sustainable development, undertaken substantial buy-
backs of fishing effort, implemented detailed scientific fishery
management plans that incorporate strong stakeholder in-
volvement, and expanded its National Representative System
of Marine Protected Areas (McLoughlin and Findlay 2005).
Despite such strategies, fishers have successfully lobbied
against recommended reductions in the TACs (McLoughlin
and Findlay 2005). This lobbying, combined with effort creep
in some input-controlled fisheries (Kompas et al. 2004), have
contributed to a threefold increase in the number of Austra-
lian Federal fisheries classified as overfished in the past
10 years (Caton and McLoughlin 2005).
A similar story can be told in many other developed fish-
eries, even when the primary stated objective of manage-
ment is to conserve fish stocks. Maguire (2003) observes
that inappropriate incentives, inadequate and overly complex
governance, and lack of knowledge are the main causes of
the unsustainable harvesting of demersal fisheries in the North
Atlantic. In these fisheries, despite the focus on the bio-
ecological component of sustainability, management systems
have frequently failed to achieve the desired outcomes. On-
going effort creep has also led, in some jurisdictions, to an
escalating complexity of rules as regulators try to close off
the loopholes, leading to confusion and making enforcement
difficult (Healey and Hennessey 1998). Resolving these
challenges requires major changes that include a precaution-
ary approach to management (FAO 1996), more transparent
and participatory management, and a greater emphasis on in-
centives and rights for fishers (Maguire 2003).
Incentive-based approaches
The failures of traditional management suggest not only
that total harvests must be set appropriately, but also that the
greatest marine predator, fishers, be provided with the incen-
tives to fish sustainably. A key to creating incentives for
more sustainable behavior is to provide fishers with more
secure harvesting or territorial rights to fish. Such rights en-
able fishers to enjoy a sustainable flow of benefits from fish-
ing with an enforceable right to exclude others from these
benefits but generally do not give ownership over the re-
source stock. Fishing rights may take several different forms
(The World Bank 2004) and include individual harvesting
rights (Scott 1999a), community- or group-based rights
(Baland and Platteau 1996), and territorial user rights
(Christy 1999; Sharp 1998).
Economic fishing rights are commonly viewed as a recent
innovation, at least in terms of individual harvesting rights,
but they have existed for centuries. For example, in Oceania,
no-take areas, territorial user rights, and cooperative man-
agement ensured sustainable fisheries for centuries by allow-
ing clans or families to control, for their benefit, reef and
lagoon areas (Johannes 1978). The success of traditional ma-
rine tenure suggests that a key to generating appropriate
incentives is for fishers to have the ability to exclude others
from fishing, thereby reaping both the pain of over-
exploitation and the gains from conservation. Exclusive
property rights, however, do not guarantee sustainability. In
extreme cases, it may be economically rational to mine a
fishery (Clark 1973), and if the holders of rights are large in
number and with diffuse interests, incentives may still re-
main to cheat and take advantage of the conservation efforts
of others. All fisheries are also subject to irreducible uncer-
tainties (Ludwig et al. 1993) that make it difficult to set sus-
tainable harvests and to understand the long-term impacts of
fishing practices.
Incentive-based approaches make management more ro-
bust by ensuring, in most cases, that those who have the
greatest impact on fisheries have an increased interest in
their long-run conservation and directly bear the cost of
overexploitation. We review the contributions of incentive-
based approaches to sustainable fisheries in the following
subsections.
Rights and responsibilities
The key to IAFs is to provide harvesters with long-term
and secure rights (Hannesson 2004) that are legally enforce-
able, along with corresponding duties by nonowners to not
interfere with these rights (Cole and Grossman 2002). In
practice, individual harvesting rights are often specified as a
revokable privilege, although New Zealand is a notable ex-
ception (National Research Council 1999). However, these
privileges are de facto economic property rights, provided
that adequate monitoring and surveillance exists. Control
and enforcement should also ensure that the holders of the
harvesting rights meet their responsibilities under the FAO’s
Code of Conduct (FAO 1995; Symes 2000), while fishers
without such rights, or other privileges, are excluded from
harvesting.
Secure and durable harvesting or territorial rights, in most
cases, provide fishers with two incentives: they protect the
value of their assets and also encourage the greatest possible
sustainable flow of benefits from fishing. These incentives
are complementary and occur concurrently, but the former is
likely to be manifested in forms of collective action, whereas
the latter manifests itself in individual actions. Individual
efforts by fishers to maximize their net returns indirectly
contribute to sustainable fisheries by improving economic
performance and reducing the problems of overcapacity,
while collective actions involve direct attempts to ensure
sustainability by improving management decision making,
the quality of scientific advice, and the monitoring of fisher
behavior.
At the individual level, quantified fishing rights encourage
fishers to harvest their fixed catch at lowest cost, to increase
the value of landings through better handling and care of
fish (Campbell et al. 2000a; Rice 2003; Dupont et al. 2005),
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or to change product form (from frozen to fresh), as oc-
curred in the British Columbia (BC) halibut (Hippoglossus
stenolepsis) fishery (Casey et al. 1995; Herrmann 1996).
Such efforts, and the transferability that allows more profitable
fishers to harvest a larger share of the total catch, improve effi-
ciency (Grafton et al. 2000) and increase productivity (Fox et
al. 2003a). Transfers of individual harvesting rights, in many
cases, also help reduce overcapacity (Dupont et al. 2005),
which is a major contributor to overexploitation of fisheries
and poor economic returns for fishers.
Individual rights and collective action
A long-term interest in the fishery in the form of harvest-
ing rights can encourage collective action to ensure manage-
ment practices are consistent with maintaining the long-term
value of these rights. By itself, greater participation in man-
agement decision making by fishers is not sufficient to pro-
mote sustainable fisheries, but we argue that sustainability is
promoted by fisher participation in combination with more
secure harvesting rights. Individual harvesting rights also
provide a way to allocate joint management costs and thus
help overcome the underprovision of services that benefit all
fishers (Scott 1993).
There is evidence that individual harvesting rights can
promote collective action in shellfish, demersal, and pelagic
fisheries (Shotton 2001). For example, in the New Zealand
east coast rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii) fishery, the intro-
duction of individual harvesting rights prompted commercial
stakeholders to initiate a locally focused fishing strategy.
The industry successfully requested the regulator to lower
the commercial catch and to restrict harvesting to a shorter
winter period to make widespread illegal fishing easier to
detect (Breen and Kendrick 1997). These and other fisher-
initiated management measures have resulted in a dramatic
stock recovery and substantially higher quota values (Leal et
al. 2005). Similarly, in 2001, the scientist contracted by the
Canadian Sablefish Association (CSA), an organization of
commercial fishers with individual harvesting rights, advised
of rapid declines in sablefish abundance. Shortly thereafter
the CSA recommended to the regulator that the total catch
be immediately reduced as a precautionary measure. Subse-
quent stock recovery that followed a decline in the TAC by
almost 50% has allowed CSA members to benefit from their
conservation efforts. In the Tasmanian abalone fishery, indi-
vidual quota holders with direct involvement in advising the
regulator successfully lobbied for large reductions in the to-
tal catch in the late 1980s. This allowed the stock to rebuild,
and the quota holders were the principal beneficiaries of
subsequent increases in the total harvest (Tasmanian Aba-
lone Council 2003). The successful rebuilding of the Icelan-
dic herring (Clupea harengus) stocks, through cuts in the
TAC, were also strongly supported by industry because fish-
ers wanted to protect the asset value of their harvesting
rights (Hannesson 1996).
Individual harvesting rights can provide greater incentives
for more bottom-up decision-making processes and opportu-
nities for increased participation (Lane and Stephenson 2000).
Indeed, if the creation of rights promotes economic
sustainability, for which there is abundant evidence in the
form of case studies (Davidse et al. 1997; Kaufmann et al.
1999; Shotton 2001), it is not surprising that holders of such
rights would be prepared to invest their time and effort to
protect their flow of benefits from fishing. This may take the
form of funding for more on-board and dockside surveil-
lance, increased research to improve the quality of scientific
advice, and greater participation in management decision
making. For example, in the BC sablefish (Anoploma fimbria)
fishery, managed by individual harvesting rights since 1990,
fishers initiated and funded research on trap escape rings
that dramatically reduced juvenile capture and mortality. Af-
ter individual harvesting rights were introduced in BC’s hal-
ibut fishery, harvesters (through their industry association)
set up and paid for dockside monitoring that tags every fish
(Grafton et al. 2000). Similarly, in the BC groundfish trawl
fishery, also managed by individual harvesting rights, fishers
are strong supporters of science and have contributed mil-
lions of dollars to research (Rice 2003). Elsewhere, such as
in New Zealand’s fisheries, which have been managed by
individual harvesting rights since 1986, fishers make impor-
tant financial contributions to management through their as-
sociations and are also active participants in some fisheries
research (Lydon and Langley 2003).
Group rights and collective action
Collective action can be encouraged in a number of differ-
ent ways such as allowing fishers to organize and express
their concerns to managers (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997) and
participate in fisheries research and management (Rice
2001). Collective action can also be promoted through the
allocation and support of harvesting rights for groups and to
communities (Baland and Platteau 1996; Willmann 1999).
For example, the Canadian government has created seven
geographically based community management boards for the
fixed-gear groundfish fishery in Nova Scotia. Each of these
boards is charged with developing community harvesting
plans and controlling the fishing activities of members (Pea-
cock and Hansen 1999). This enables local knowledge to
inform allocation decisions and prevents a one-size-fits-all
approach to fisheries management.
The potential benefits of collective action with group rights
is shown by purse seine fishers who recently established a
cooperative in Alaska’s Chignik salmon (Oncorhynchus
nerka) fishery following a change in regulations passed by
the Alaska Board of Fisheries. In a 2002 survey of all coop-
erative members, 67% claim that it has made them finan-
cially better off, 100% state that it has improved fish quality,
and 88% consider it to have been either a very positive or a
somewhat positive change in the management of the fishery
(Knapp et al. 2002).
Numerous examples show that both community and group
rights can improve management outcomes with collective
action (Ostrom et al. 1994; Baland and Platteau 1996; Dietz
et al. 2003). These actions are facilitated by social capital
within communities and by trust between management au-
thorities and fishers (Pretty 2003; Grafton 2005), but social
capital does not necessarily require the existence of individ-
ual or group harvesting rights (Dietz et al. 2003). For in-
stance, trust between scientists and fishers in the BC
rockfish (Sebastes spp.) fishery in the 1990s led to new hy-
potheses and novel ways for testing them (Stanley and Rice
2003). It also contributed to a constructive advisory process
that included an official working group with members from
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the industry and the regulator (science and fisheries manage-
ment) that was established before the introduction of indi-
vidual harvesting rights in the fishery (Rice 2003).
Participatory management and the allocation problem
Examples of effective participatory management in fisher-
ies in which fishers bear the consequences of failures, as
well as successes, should not be taken as proof that greater
participation by fishers in management always generates
better fisheries outcomes. We contend that participatory
management, coupled with a failure to resolve the allocation
problem (i.e., who gets what), may actually generate poorer
sustainability outcomes and allow special interest groups to
negatively influence management authorities as fishers com-
pete for control of allocation mechanisms. For example, un-
der the US 1977 Fishery Conservation and Management Act,
power sharing among the federal government, fishers, and other
stakeholders has occurred through Fishery Management Coun-
cils (FMCs). Turner and Weninger (2005) find that this particu-
lar system of voluntary participation in the regulatory process
leads to over-representation by industry members with extreme
preferences. Not surprisingly, this deconcentration of manage-
ment authority has not been viewed as a success (Pomeroy
and Berkes 1997). It has also been plagued by conflicts of
interest (Allison 2002), and some FMCs appear to have sac-
rificed long-term conservation for short-run economic con-
siderations (Parsons 1993).
At least in the case of the United States, a consultative
system and delegation of management authority to fishers
and other resource stakeholders, in the absence of appropri-
ate fisher incentives and resolution of the harvest allocation
problem, has contributed to rent-seeking behavior and con-
flicts among different interest groups. This has made deci-
sion making less, rather than more, effective (Mikalsen and
Jentoft 2001).
Incomplete harvesting rights
An important issue when establishing harvesting rights is to
ensure that they do not create perverse incentives that distort
behavior and produce undesirable outcomes. This demands
that rights for commercial fishers be as comprehensive as
possible to avoid transfer of effort to non-quota species and
that all commercial fishers are included. In Iceland, for ex-
ample, exemptions from individual catch quotas for vessels
under 10 gross registered tonnes, until they were abolished
in 1990, distorted the composition of the fishing fleet and
encouraged investment in smaller vessels (Arnason 1995). A
similar increase in investment and catch has also occurred
with the Icelandic longline fleet because half of the demersal
catch has been exempt from quota restrictions during the
months November to February.
Conflicts between commercial and recreational fishers can
also be aggravated if the commercial fleet is subject to indi-
vidual output controls but the recreational sector is not. For
example, if individual rights only exist in the commercial
fishery and if fish stocks are under pressure because of the
expansion of the recreational catch, then the regulator may
be tempted to reduce fishing pressure by simply reducing the
commercial TAC. This undermines the commercial right,
creates uncertainty for investment, and generates protest
from the commercial sector. Such commercial–recreational
conflicts, however, are not unique to fisheries using individ-
ual rights, nor do they necessarily imply that recreational
fishers should be included within an individual quota man-
agement system in which the widely dispersed interests
would generally make the transaction costs associated with
trading and enforcing such rights prohibitive. Limits might
be better specified for the recreational sector in other ways
by, for example, imposing a mix of recreational fishing
licences and individual daily bag limits. Such controls, how-
ever, may need to be supplemented with other methods such
as spatial allocations that keep bulk fishing methods away
from favored recreational sites.
Multiple target species
The incentive-based approach is applicable to fisheries in
which there are few, or many, target species. A major con-
cern, however, is that harvesters may have little ability to
separately target each species. Consequently, the catch mix
of fishers may not match individual quota allocations, which
in turn may contribute to discarding and misreporting (Squires
et al. 1998). A limited ability to target specific species may
also result in undesirable individual quota underages and
overages and also severely constrain fishers’ profitability if
total harvests of target species are restricted to prevent the
overexploitation of vulnerable bycatch species (Squires and
Kirkley 1996). Another issue with multiple target species is
that if harvesting rights are only assigned to a subset of tar-
get species, then the transfer of fishing effort to target spe-
cies without individual harvest controls may be encouraged
(Dupont and Grafton 2001).
Although multiple target species make fisheries much more
difficult to manage, especially with the setting of TACs, the
ability of fishers to target individual species is not as con-
strained by technology as is commonly believed. Given ap-
propriate incentives, fishers are able to adapt their fishing
practices to reduce bycatch and adjust their species mix,
even if the technology remains essentially unchanged. For
example, purse seine vessels in the eastern Pacific were able
to reduce dolphin (Stenella spp., and Delphinus delphis)
mortality from over 130 000 in 1986 to less than 4000 in
1993 by changing fishing practices but using the same fun-
damental technology (Hedley 2001). In the BC groundfish
trawl fishery, onboard observers record fishery mortality
rates by species that count against quota owned or leased by
fishers. This created an incentive for fishers to avoid catch-
ing less desirable species, and led to greater communication
among skippers to avoid harvesting in areas where there was
a high incidence of unwanted species. Fishers have also
changed their behavior by using shorter tows, checking their
nets more frequently, and employing test tows before fishing
(Grafton et al. 2006).
Discards and bycatches
IAFs allow fisher incentives to be compatible with long-
term conservation, but do not guarantee that all fishing prac-
tices promote sustainability. There have been cases in which
fishers with individual harvesting rights have dumped lower
valued fish to maximize the value of their trip landings (Par-
sons 1993; Arnason 1994; Squires et al. 1998), although
such problems also exist in open-access and input-regulated
fisheries (Leal et al. 2005), especially those regulated by trip
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and (or) vessel-size restrictions. However, discarding prob-
lems with individual harvesting rights can be mitigated and
adaptively managed with appropriate incentives and instru-
ments.
In the BC groundfish trawl fishery, which has been man-
aged with individual harvesting rights since 1997, fish dump-
ing is recorded by observers on all vessels and is counted
against individual quotas. This quota reconciliation provides
harvesters with the incentive to be much more selective in
their fishing practices. As a result, the ratio of at-sea releases
to the landed fish weight has greatly declined (Grafton et al.
2006). Recently, fishers have, on their own initiative, under-
taken research that halved the fishing mortality of bocaccio
rockfish (Sebastes paucispinis), a bycatch species that was
designated as being at risk in 2002 by the Committee on the
Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada and for which har-
vesters do not have specific species quota (Fisheries and
Oceans Canada 2004b; Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2005).
This protects their livelihood because, should the boccacio
be listed as requiring protection by the federal cabinet under
Canada’s 2003 Species at Risk Act (SARA), groundfish trawl
fishing could be prohibited if current practices compromise
the rapid recovery of the species and if Incidental Harm Per-
mits were not issued to allow boccacio bycatch (Rice 2003).
Overcapacity and buybacks
The potential payoffs from IAFs include better protection
of fish stocks and the environment, increased returns to har-
vesters (Dupont and Grafton 2001; Fox et al. 2003a; Dupont
et al. 2005), and reduced fishing capacity (Grafton et al.
1996; Dupont et al. 2002). These benefits arise because se-
cure and durable rights to fish, individually or communally,
reduce racing behavior. In contrast, in input-controlled fish-
eries, the race to fish results in excess effort, substitution of
unregulated inputs (Squires 1987), and lower overall net re-
turns (Dupont 1990). For example, in the northern prawn
(Penaeus spp.) fishery of Australia, the imposition of effort
controls in the form of combined engine size and hull length
restrictions encouraged fishers to increase the headrope length
of their trawls to maintain their effective fishing capacity.
Unfortunately, this substitution lowered technical efficiency
and raised the cost of fishing while failing to prevent effort
expansion (Kompas et al. 2004).
Top-down input controls also promote an us-versus-them
attitude with managers (Charles 1995) and frequently fail to
limit fishing effort (Townsend 1990) because the underlying
incentives to race to fish are unchanged. As a result, over the
period of 1970 to 1990, worldwide harvesting capacity in
commercial fisheries grew eight times faster than landings
(Gréboval and Munro 1999), and overcapacity has been a
significant contributor to the overexploitation of fisheries
(FAO 1997). Continued effort expansion under input con-
trols also obliges regulators to implement further operational
constraints, such as shorter fishing seasons, in attempts to
ensure that TACs are not exceeded. These constraints often
aggravate the race to fish and contribute to further overca-
pacity (Clark 1982), as occurred in the BC halibut fishery
before the implementation of individual harvesting rights, as
well as in numerous other fisheries. The resulting capacity
overhang makes fisheries less robust to management errors,
especially in setting appropriate TACs, and also creates po-
litical pressures by fishers to increase the total harvest.
When overcapacity reaches a critical level, regulators fre-
quently resort to buybacks of vessels or associated fishing
licences. Often, the direct costs of buybacks are borne by the
public purse and not by the fishers themselves. Buybacks are
only a short-term solution to the underlying incentive prob-
lem; if they are successful in temporarily increasing the re-
turns to harvesters who continue to fish, higher profits would
encourage further investments and effort creep (Weninger and
McConnell 2000) and, if anticipated by fishers, may even
detract from conservation efforts (Clark et al. 2005). As a re-
sult, the ability of buybacks to reduce long-term fishing ef-
fort and help stocks recover is limited (Holland et al. 1999)
without a corresponding change in fisher incentives (Fox et
al. 2003b). For example, buybacks initiated in the northeast
groundfish fishery in the United States reduced the number
of permits and the number of vessels employed but do not
appear to have resulted in observable conservation benefits
(Walden et al. 2003). In the BC salmon fishery, there have
been five buybacks at a cumulative cost of several hundred
million dollars over the period 1970–2000. Although these
buybacks may have temporarily reduced the severity of the
overcapacity problem caused by both effort creep and a de-
cline in the size of some salmon runs, they have not pro-
vided a lasting solution to the chronic problem of overcapacity
(Schwindt et al. 2003; Grafton and Nelson 2005).
Transferability, costs, returns, and subsidies
Transferable harvesting rights, and the prices that they can
command, induce some fishers to exit and remove excess
fishing capacity, thereby increasing returns to the fishers
who remain. For transfers of rights to function efficiently,
the market for harvesting rights must be competitive and
prices must convey useful information about the profitability
and status of fish stocks. A recent study of New Zealand’s
markets for individual harvesting rights, the most compre-
hensive of any fisheries jurisdiction, found that prices there
do reflect ecological variability and changes in fishing prof-
itability (Newell et al. 2005).
High values for harvesting rights, concentration of these
rights, or simply the gratis allocation of harvesting rights
over a public resource are viewed by some as inequitable
(Walters and Martell 2004), especially if the initial alloca-
tion of rights excludes crew members and traditional partici-
pants in the fishery. To address some of these concerns, it is
possible to limit the amount of harvesting rights owned by
any one individual or company, or to even set aside a share
of the rights as a code-of-conduct quota to promote the interest
of the crew, as has occurred in the BC groundfish trawl fish-
ery (Rice 2003). A share of the increased returns (and long-
term value of rights) attributable to incentive-based ap-
proaches may also be captured to reduce the entry costs for
prospective fishers and to collect revenues for the public
purse (Grafton 1995).
Individualized and exclusive rights not only identify resource
users and limit their number, but also limit the specific mag-
nitude of the interests of each individual fisher in terms of
the TAC. This allows research and management costs attrib-
utable to fishing activity to be charged proportionally to the
beneficiaries. Such cost recovery introduces a new and pow-
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erful dynamic into the relationship between fishers and regu-
lators that has potential to drive down management costs,
improve voluntary compliance, and encourage collective ac-
tion and greater fisher participation in management and re-
search.
Higher fisher returns with IAFs allow the possibility of
fisher-funded monitoring and additional data collection.
Incentive-based approaches also reduce the motivation for
price supports or vessel and gear subsidies, which contribute
to overfishing (Milazzo 1998; Munro and Sumaila 2002).
For example, Iceland and New Zealand both have long-term
individual harvesting rights in many of their fisheries and
had government financial transfers in the late 1990s equal to
about 4% of the total value of their respective landings (see
table A.2 in Cox and Schmidt 2002). In contrast, the total
government financial transfers to fisheries regulated with in-
put controls are often much higher. In 1999, for instance, to-
tal government transfers were, on average, some 20% of the
total value of landings in OECD (Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development) countries (see table A.4 in
Cox and Schmidt 2002).
Because traditional input regulation contributes to overca-
pacity and low fishing incomes, it stimulates government
financial transfers. In contrast, IAFs may be viewed as gen-
erating a win–win situation: better sustainability outcomes at
a lower overall cost of management (including transfers). In-
deed, a recent comparison of Iceland, Norway, and New-
foundland showed that the costs of fisheries management,
not including government financial transfers, were lowest in
Iceland, the country that has gone the furthest to implement
secure fishing rights in any of these three jurisdictions
(Arnason et al. 2003).
Adjustment costs, economic viability, and flexible
decision making
A key concern, especially to crew, is that IAFs reduce em-
ployment and create other adjustment costs (OECD 2000).
The impact on employment, however, depends on the extent
to which the fishery is overexploited in an economic sense.
For example, in New Zealand, the total employment and
number of vessels actually increased in the first 5 years after
the introduction of individual harvesting rights (Davidse et
al. 1997; Connor 2001) as a result of the domestication of
deep-water fisheries and increased harvests from some rela-
tively unexploited stocks. When harvesting rights reduce
employment, as might be expected in fisheries characterized
by poor returns and overcapacity, the adjustment costs should
be weighed against the possibility of declining returns, on-
going difficulties with traditional input controls, and the
probability that current employment levels under existing
regulations are unsustainable.
Political decision making, with respect to fisheries man-
agement, is influenced by economic circumstances. Where
there are many fishers with poor incomes and few alternative
employment opportunities, it is much more difficult to re-
duce current catches to sustainable levels than when fishing is
economically viable. In other words, inappropriate incentives
that generate low fisher incomes reduce management flexibil-
ity and, therefore, increase the likelihood of risk-prone deci-
sions (Sissenwine and Rosenberg 1993). In contrast,
incentive approaches promote economic performance. Thus,
when an unexpected negative shock arises, the economic im-
pact is less critical and the management response is likely to
be quicker and more effective. The incentive approach,
therefore, helps to avoid the social and biological amplifica-
tion of natural fisheries variability, a highly desirable char-
acteristic of fisheries management (Rice 2002).
Sustaining ecosystems
Harvesting, community, and territorial rights do not guar-
antee that all fishery practices will be sustainable, but they
can create incentives for fishers to protect their rights by dis-
couraging practices that are overtly damaging, and promote
actions that conserve target species. We address how differ-
ent incentives can contribute to sustaining ecosystems in the
following three subsections.
Multiple stakeholders and collective action
In New Zealand, commercial fishers have recognized that
the environment of the Fiordland, listed as a UNESCO
World Heritage Site, is vulnerable to harvesting. To address
these concerns, an alliance of conservation groups, commer-
cial and recreational fishers, and Maori interests, called the
Fiordland Marine Guardians (FMG), developed a strategy to
protect environmental quality while providing for sustain-
able harvesting. It creates eight fully protected marine re-
serves and several no-anchoring zones, excludes commercial
fishing from all inland waters, creates a tailored recreational
fishing regime, and establishes the FMG as a formal advi-
sory body to the government (New Zealand Government
2005). Without well-defined harvesting rights and the incen-
tives they engender, this successful balancing of interests
and responsibilities across stakeholders would have been im-
possible.
Coordination and effective oversight
Despite the potential of IAFs to contribute to sustain-
ability, a public oversight and coordination role to integrate
commercial resource use with environmental impacts and
other resource interests is still required, because it is not
possible to specify property rights over every aspect of the
environment in advance and thus prevent all the negative
spillovers that might arise from harvesting. Public oversight
is also needed to manage straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory species and for the setting of societal objectives
and target and reference points in terms of fish stocks and
marine ecosystems. Coordination and oversight may also be
justified if the average cost of monitoring and enforcement
is lower when there are a greater number of fisheries under
surveillance, if the average cost to provide management ser-
vices is lower with a larger number of services (e.g., science
advice, monitoring, and research), or if there is a public-
good aspect (such as species diversity) to fisheries manage-
ment (Grafton 2000).
One of the more important factors in justifying public
oversight, in terms of sustainability, is the deleterious impact
on the marine environment from fishing that is incidental to
the catches of target species (Scott 1999b). For example,
longlining can cause incidental catch of sea turtles and sea
birds, trawling for shrimp can contribute to turtle mortality,
and purse seining for tuna can, in some cases, result in inci-
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dental dolphin deaths (Dayton et al. 2002). If reduced num-
bers of sea birds, turtles, and dolphins do not affect the
value of fishers’ harvesting rights over target species and
reducing these incidental catches is costly, then there is no
financial incentive for fishers to address these bycatch issues.
Quantity and price incentives for ecological services
Where threats to ecological services arise and are deemed
sufficiently costly by society to warrant intervention, fishers
can be given incentives to employ bycatch reduction devices,
to make conservation investments, or to undertake practices
that may reduce the adverse impacts of fishing. The poten-
tial of a quantity-based incentive approach compared with
traditional input controls can be illustrated by regulations
that are part of the 1998 Agreement on the International
Dolphin Conservation Program in the Eastern Tropical Pa-
cific (Hedley 2001). As part of this agreement, vessels flagged
by signatory countries that exceed their annual dolphin mor-
tality limits (DMLs) must stop fishing. On all vessels greater
than 400 tons (1 ton = 1.016 tonnes), DMLs are enforced by
onboard observers who record the numbers of dolphins
killed from the harvesting of yellowfin tuna (Thunnus alba-
cares). Although these rights are by no means complete
property rights (Campbell et al. 2000b), some reassignment
of unused or forfeited rights is permitted, and in the first
year of their introduction, DMLs helped to reduce total dol-
phin mortality by more than 75% (Hedley 2001).
Habitat damage can arise from some forms of harvesting,
such as bottom trawling (Jennings and Kaiser 1998; Dayton
et al. 2002; ICES 2005b). This could potentially be miti-
gated through incentives, e.g., through the use of transfer-
able habitat impact units (HIUs) that would proxy marginal
habitat damage associated with different gear and habitats
(Holland and Schnier 2004). The total number of HIUs would
be set to ensure a desired level of habitat protection and
would be enforced with a vessel monitoring system that
would track each vessel’s location and rate of movement.
Fishers would be motivated to take into account the impact
of fishing on habitats because HIUs would be scarce and
tradable. Those who exceed their initial allocation of HIUs
would be required to purchase more units, which would in-
crease their fishing costs, whereas those who have HIUs left
over after fishing could sell or lease them to others at a
profit.
A price-based approach to sustaining ecosystems could in-
volve the imposition of environmental charges on vessels
that impose a particular risk or harm to the marine environ-
ment and then the use of the funds from these charges to un-
dertake conservation investments. For example, an industry
association of gillnet fishers in California have proposed a
turtle tax, related to turtle mortality from swordfish (Xiphias
gladius) harvesting, to pay for the protection of critical
leatherback (Dermochelys coriacea) nesting sites in Agua
Blanca, Baja California (C. Janisse, Federation of Independ-
ent Seafood Harvesters (FISH), P.O. Box 352, Bridgewater
Corners, VA 05035, USA, cjanisse@vermontel.net, unpub-
lished data). Similar approaches could also be adopted in
other fisheries, especially if public, private sector, or non-
governmental funds were used to provide financial incen-
tives for fishers to undertake more sustainable fishing
practices. These could, for example, include the eco-
certification of sustainable fisheries (Peterman 2002) and
harvesting practices to provide a price premium for ecology-
friendly fishing, vessel- or gear-specific harvesting charges
to promote sustainable practices, and market-based instru-
ments to price ecosystem services. A price-based approach
that would help maximize the environmental payoff per
dollar of conservation expenditures by regulators or non-
governmental organizations would be to allow fishers to bid
or tender for biodiversity conservation payments to under-
take specific management actions, but within a framework
of well-defined ecological quality objectives (ICES 2005b,
pp. 32–60). Such an approach has proved successful in
changing practices by landholders and has promoted conser-
vation in a cost-effective manner on farms in the State of
Victoria, Australia (Stoneham et al. 2003).
Both price- and quantity-based incentives complement
ecosystem approaches because they reduce the negative ef-
fects of harvesting on endangered and protected species and
help to conserve nonmarketed ecosystem services. The key
insight from experience to date in commercial fisheries is
that appropriate fisher incentives, coupled with public re-
search, monitoring, and effective oversight, promote more
sustainable fishing practices.
Concluding remarks
The alarming trends in the world’s fisheries demand a
fundamental change in management and fishing practices.
As managers grapple with these problems, many scientists
are arguing for a new paradigm and, in particular, an ecosys-
tem approach to fisheries to overcome the failures of single-
or target-species management. While the ecosystem approach
and existing strategies that promote sustainability are neces-
sary, especially to account for fishery–ecosystem interactions,
they are insufficient by themselves to address the key drivers
of unsustainable outcomes, i.e., inappropriate incentives for
fishers and the ineffective governance that exists in commer-
cial fisheries regulated exclusively by input controls and
TACs. Evidence from more than a dozen natural experiments
of commercial, developed fisheries supports our conclusion:
incentive-based approaches that better specify individual and
group harvesting rights and (or) territorial rights, as well as
price ecosystem services, promote both economic and eco-
logical sustainability.
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